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Abstract
Secure quantum key distribution can be achieved with an imperfect single-photon source through
implementing the decoy-state method. However, security of all those theoretical results of decoy-
state method based on the original framework raised by Hwang needs monitoring the source state
very carefully, because the elementary proposition that the counting rates of the same state from
different sources are equal does not hold in general when the source is unstable. Source intensity
monitoring greatly decreases the system efficiency. Here without using Hwang’s proposition for
stable source, we present a sufficient condition for a secure decoy-state protocol without monitoring
the source intensity. The passive 2-intensity protocol proposed by Adachi, Yamamoto, Koashi, and
Imoto(AYKI) (Phys. Rev. Lett. 99, 180503 (2007) ) satisfies the condition. Therefore, the protocol
can always work securely without monitoring the source state or switching the source intensity.
We also show that our result can greatly improve the key rate of the 3-intensity protocol with a
fluctuating coherent-state source.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
∗Electronic address: xbwang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imperfect single-photon source is used in most of the existing set-ups of quantum key
distribution (QKD)[1–3]. To make it secure even under photon-number-splitting attack
[4, 5], one can use the decoy-state method [7–13] based on the general theory of QKD with
an imperfect source which was first built by Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus and Mayers[3] and then
father studied with some improved results[6]. There are also some other methods [14, 15]
which can make secure QKD with an imperfect source.
Though many experiments on the decoy-state QKD have been done [16], the original
decoy-state theory[8–10] assumes perfect control of the source states in the photon number
space. This is an impossible task for any real set-up in practic. A new non-trivial problem
arises in practice is how to carry out the decoy-state method securely and efficiently with
an unstable source.
The most important proposition of the decoy-state method given by Hwang[8] is
sk = s
′
k (1)
where sk and s
′
k are the yield (counting rate) of those k−photon pulses from the decoy source
and that from the signal source. However, as pointed out in Ref.[7, 19, 20] with concrete
examples that this elementary proposition does not always hold for a fluctuating source.
(Note that the fluctuation of each individual pulses are in general not independent.)
To solve this problem, a number of theoretical works have been done[17–22]. In particular,
without using Eq.(1), a general formula was given in Ref.[19] for the 3-intensity decoy-state
method with whatever type of error pattern in the source, if we can monitor the range of a
few parameters of each individual pulse state out of Alice’s lab. Although source monitoring
can be done with the existing technology by detecting the intensity of a strong father pulse
in the beginning[23, 24], it will raise the cost of the real QKD system and decrease the
outcome efficiency because the repetition rate of strong pulse detection is low. Therefore, it
is a meaningful job to find a class of decoy-state protocols which can work securely without
monitoring any source fluctuation .
Here, without using Eq.(1), we shall give the condition that a decoy state protocol can
work securely with a fluctuating source. We then show that the 2-intensity passive protocol
proposed by Adachi, Yamamoto, Koashi, and Imoto (AYKI)[12] meets the condition of our
theorem.
2
In what follows, we shall first derive an improved formula for a 2-intensity decoy-state
protocol with source fluctuation. Based on this, we propose a theorem on the condition for a
protocol to work securely without source monitoring. Directly applying the theorem we find
AYKI protocol meets the condition and the main formula in AYKI protocol is independent
of whatever source intensity fluctuation. We then extend our formula to the 3-intensity
protocol and show its high efficiency for a coherent-state based protocol with numerical
simulation.
II. OUR THEOREM AYKI PROTOCOL
In a 2-intensity protocol, Alice has 2 (virtual) sources, the decoy source Y which prepares
decoy pulses, and the signal source Y’ which prepares signal pulses. At any time i, each
source prepares a pulse and Alice randomly choose one of them sending out to Bob. Suppose
at any time i Alice has a probability pi, p
′
i to sends out the pulse from source Y and Y
′,
respectively (pi + p
′
i = 1). Note that pi, p
′
i are not necessarily constant values here. Denote
ρi, ρ
′
i as state of a decoy pulse and that of a signal pulse produced at the ith time:
ρi =
J∑
k=0
aki|k〉〈k| ; ρ
′
i =
J∑
k=0
a′ki|k〉〈k|. (2)
Here J can be either finite or infinite.
Definitely, it makes no difference if all pulses sent out to Bob are actually produced by
only one physical source. But we assume there are two sources for clarity in presentation.
In the whole protocol, Alice sends Bob M pulses, one by one. In response to Alice, Bob
observes his detector for M times. As Bob’s ith observed result, Bob’s detector can either
click or not click. If the detector clicks in Bob’s ith observation, then we say that “the ith
pulse from Alice has caused a count”. We disregard how the ith pulse may change after it
is sent out. When we say that Alice’s ith pulse has caused a count we actually mean that
pulse is accompanied by a click at Bob’s side at Bob’s ith observation.
Given the source state in Eqs.(2), any ith pulse sent out by Alice must be in a specific
photon-number state. To anyone outside Alice’s lab, it looks as if that Alice only sends a
photon number state at each time i: sometimes it’s vacuum, sometimes it’s a single-photon
pulse, sometimes it is a 2−photon pulses, and so on. We shall make use of this fact that any
individual pulse is in one Fock state. On the other hand, pulses sent out to Bob can also be
3
classified by which source it comes from, i.e., a decoy pulse if it is from the decoy source or
a signal pulse if it is from the signal source.
Given Eqs.(2), we have the following formulas for Pdi|k and Psi|k , the probabilities that
the ith pulse comes from the decoy source or signal source; if the ith pulse contains k photons:
Pdi|k = piakidki, Psi|k = p
′
ia
′
kidki (3)
where
dki =
1
piaki + p′ia
′
ki
, for k ≥ 0. (4)
Based on these, we can build up equations which lead to lower bound of the number of
single-photon counts.
A. Definitions
We postulate some definitions first: Set Ω = {i = 1, 2, · · ·M}, it contains all i. Set C
contains any pulse that has caused a count; set ck contains any k−photon pulse that has
caused a count. Mathematically, the sufficient and necessary condition for i ∈ C is that the
ith pulse has caused a count. The sufficient and necessary condition for i ∈ ck is that the
ith pulse contains k photons and it has caused a count. For instance, if the photon number
states of the first 10 pulses from Alice are |0〉, |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |0〉, |1〉, |3〉, |2〉, |1〉, |0〉, and
the pulses of i = 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 each has caused a count at Bob’s side, then we have
C = {i|i = 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, · · ·}; c0 = {i|i = 2, 5, 10, · · ·}; c1 = {i|i = 3, 6, 9, · · ·}. (5)
The number of counts caused by k−photon pulse nk is just the number of elements in set
ck. We shall use notation nkd, nks for the the number of counts caused by a k−photon decoy
pulse and a k−photon signal pulse, respectively. These numbers cannot be directly observed
in the experiment. Obviously, nkd + nks = nk. Suppose in the whole protocol, there are Nd
counts caused by decoy pulses and Ns counts caused by signal pulses. Note that Nd and Ns
can be directly observed in the protocol therefore we regard them as known values. Our goal
is to find a formula for n1s, i.e., to formulate n1s by n0s, n0d and the known values Nd, Ns
and the bound values of the parameters in the decoy state and signal state of Eq.(2). (In
a 2-intensity protocol, values of n0d or n0s is unknown, but one can still calculate the final
key rate with worst-case estimation[10, 12].)
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B. Derivation of Main formulas
With definitions postulated earlier, we have
Nd =
J∑
k=0
nkd, Ns =
J∑
k=0
nks (6)
Asymptotically,
nkd =
∑
i∈ck
Pdi|k; nks =
∑
i∈ck
Psi|k (7)
Consequently,
Nd = n0d +
∑
i∈c1
pia1id1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
piakidki, (8)
Ns = n0s +
∑
i∈c1
p′ia
′
1id1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
p′ia
′
kid1i. (9)
We want to find the lower bound of value n1s. Recall the definition of dki in Eq.(4), we
have
n1s =
∑
i∈c1
p′ia
′
1id1i ≥ N˜1s =
∑
i∈c1
1
1 + maxi∈c1(
pia1i
p′ia
′
1i
)
n1d =
∑
i∈c1
pia1id1i ≤ n1d + n1s − N˜1s = max
i∈c1
(
pia1i
p′ia
′
1i
)N˜1s (10)
Eqs.(8, 9) can be written in
Nd = n0d +max
j∈c1
(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)N˜1s + Λ− ξ1 (11)
Ns = n0s + N˜1s + Λ
′ + ξ1 (12)
where
Λ =
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
piakidki; Λ
′ =
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
p′ia
′
kidki, (13)
and
ξ1 = n1s − N˜1s ≥ 0 (14)
Using the expression of Λ′, we will have:
Λ′ =
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
p′ia
′
ki
piaki + p′ia
′
ki
≥
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
1
1 + maxj∈ck(
pjakj
p′ja
′
kj
)
.
= Λ˜ (15)
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Further, we assume the important condition
max
j∈ck
(
pjakj
p′ja
′
kj
) ≤ max
j∈c2
(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
) ≤ max
j∈c1
(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
), for all k ≥ 2. (16)
So we can write Λ′ = Λ˜ + ξ2 and ξ2 ≥ 0. We also have:
Λ =
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
piaki
piaki + p′ia
′
ki
=
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
(1−
p′ia
′
ki
piaki + p′ia
′
ki
)
=
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
(1−
1
1 + maxj∈ck(
pjakj
p′ja
′
kj
)
)− ξ2
=
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
maxj∈ck(
pjakj
p′ja
′
kj
)
1 + maxj∈ck(
pjakj
p′ja
′
kj
)
− ξ2
= max
j∈c2
(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)Λ˜− ξ2 − ξ3 (17)
where ξ3 =
∑J
k=2
∑
i∈ck
maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′
j
a′
2j
)−maxj∈ck (
pjakj
p′
j
a′
kj
)
1+maxj∈ck (
pjakj
p′
j
a′
kj
)
≥ 0, according to Eq.(16).
With Eq.(17), Eq.(12) is equivalent to
Nd = nod +max
j∈c1
(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)N˜1s +max
j∈c2
(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)Λ˜− ξ1 − ξ2 − ξ3
Ns = n0s + N˜1s + Λ˜ + ξ1 + ξ2 (18)
Given the Eqs.(11, 18), we can formulate N˜1s:
N˜1s =
Nd −maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′
j
a′
2j
)Ns +maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′
j
a′
2j
)n0s − n0d +maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′
j
a′
2j
)(ξ1 + ξ2) + ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3
maxj∈c1(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)−maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)
(19)
Since ξ1, ξ2, and ξ3 are all non-negative, and maxj∈c1(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)−maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
) ≥ 0 by Eq.(16),
we now have
N˜1s ≥
Nd −maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)Ns +maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)n0s − n0d
maxj∈c1(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)−maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)
(20)
Therefore, we can now bound the fraction of single counts among all counts caused by the
signal source
∆′1 ≥
N˜1s
Ns
≥
Nd −maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)Ns +maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)n0s − n0d
Ns(maxj∈c1(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)−maxj∈c2(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
))
≥
Nd −maxj(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)Ns +maxj(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
)n0s − n0d
Ns(maxj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)−maxj(
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
))
(21)
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The last inequality is due to the fact that if we replace maxj∈ck by maxj∈C = maxj in all
the previous derivation including Eq.(16), all the intermediate inequalities still hold. For
the decoy source, we can bound the fraction of single-photon counts by:
∆1 ≥ min
j
(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)∆′1 (22)
where minj = minj∈C . In calculating the final key rate, we also need the relation between
quantum bit error rate (QBER) for single-photon counts due to the decoy source e1d and
due to the signal source e1s. Suppose i ∈ c1 and quantum bit flip probability is e1i. Then
the total errors for single photon counts from each sources are:
e1d =
∑
i∈c1
pia1ie1i
pia1i+p′ia
′
1i
n1d
(23)
e1s =
∑
i∈c1
p′ia
′
1ie1i
pia1i+p′ia
′
1i
n1s
(24)
Since n1s =
∑
i∈c1
p′ia
′
1i
pia1i+p′ia
′
1i
=
∑
i∈c1
pia1i
p′ia
′
1i
pia1i
pia1i+p′ia
′
1i
, we get:
n1s ≥
1
maxj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
n1d (25)
And there is:
∑
i∈c1
p′ia
′
1ie1i
pia1i + p′ia
′
1i
≤
1
minj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
∑
i∈c1
pia1ie1i
pia1i + p′ia
′
1i
(26)
So:
e1s ≤
maxj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
minj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
e1d (27)
In the same reason, we can also give a lower bound of e1s. Finally we obtain
minj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
maxj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
e1d ≤ e1s ≤
maxj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
minj(
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
)
e1d (28)
If
pja1j
p′
j
a′
1j
and
pja2j
p′
j
a′
2j
are constant numbers for all j ∈ C, then e1s = e1d and the last inequality in
Eq.(21) is identical to Eq.(18) of Ref.[19], which is the formula of fraction of single-photon
counts with a stable source. We conclude the following theorem:
Theorem: Decoy-state QKD with a fluctuating source can be used as if the source were
stable if
pja1j
p′ja
′
1j
and
pja2j
p′ja
′
2j
are constant numbers for all j ∈ C.
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Interestingly, the condition in the theorem is not equivalent to Eq.(1), the elementary
proposition given by Hwang[8]. Our theorem only depends on the fluctuation characteri-
zation of those pulses in set C, i.e., those pulses accompanied by a click of Bob’s detector,
while Eq.(1) actually requests nkd/Nkd = n1d/N1d therefore needs the fluctuation character-
ization of all pulses from Alice’s lab. Here Nkd and Nks are number of k-photon pulses from
decoy source and that from signal source, respectively. Given this fact, one can in principle
construct specific cases where Eq.(1) does not hold while the condition in our theorem still
holds. This shows that our Eq.(3) is indeed more fundamental and more general than Eq.(1).
C. Conclusion on AYKI protocol
The AYKI protocol uses a heralded source of:
|Ψi〉AS =
∞∑
k=0
√
Xki|k〉A|k〉S (29)
where Xki = µ
k
i (1 + µi)
−(k+1). The heralded source state can be produced by, e.g., the
parametric down conversion (PDC) which is pumped by strong light pulses whose intensity
fluctuation can be as large as 20%. In the protocol, Alice detects mode A and sends out
mode S to Bob. Mode S is a decoy pulse when Alice’s detector clicks and a signal pulse
when her detectors does not click. Suppose Alice’s detector has a detecting efficiency ηA
and dark count rate dA. At any time i, given the two mode state in Eq.(29), the probability
that her detector clicks or not is
p′i =
dA + µiηA
1 + µiηA
pi =
1− dA
1 + µiηA
(30)
When the detector clicks or not, we obtain a signal state or a decoy state at mode S in the
form of Eq.(2), and
aki =
1 + µiηA
1− dA
Xki(1− γk)
a′ki =
1 + µiηA
dA + µiηA
Xkiγk (31)
and
γk = 1− (1− dA)(1− ηA)
k (32)
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We find
piaki
p′ia
′
ki
=
1− γk
γn
=
(1− dA)(1− ηA)
k
1− (1− dA)(1− ηA)k
(33)
They are independent on i, hence source fluctuation does not change the final formula of the
protocol by our theorem. Also, according to Eq.(21) we can write:
n1s = N˜1s ≥
Nd −
1−γ2
γ2
Ns +
1−γ2
γ2
n0s − n0d
1−γ1
γ1
− 1−γ2
γ2
(34)
Using the fact n0s
n0d
=
p′ia
′
0i
pia0i
= dA
1−dA
we have
∆′1 ≥
Nd −
1−γ2
γ2
Ns − (1−
1−γ2
γ2
dA
1−dA
)n0d
Ns(
1−γ1
γ1
− 1−γ2
γ2
)
(35)
which is just the major formula in Ref.[12]. We have not used Eq.(1) in our proof, though
the derivation given by AYKI[12] have assumed one constant intensity µ and used the
assumption of Eq.(1). Our proof concludes that the AYKI protocol actually works securely
with whatever intensity fluctuation, though the key rate can be low if the source fluctuation
is large, in which case one may observe poor values of Ns and Nd.
III. IMPROVED FORMULA FOR 3-INTENSITY PROTOCOL
If we add a vacuum source to the 2-intensity protocol and uses vacuum source with
probability pvi at the ith time, we have a 3-intensity protocol where one can estimate number
of vacuum counts n0s, n0d more precisely therefore improve the final key rate. Suppose the
vacuum source caused N0 clicks. By similar derivation done in Ref.[19], we obtain
n0d ≤
1
p0
max
j∈c˜0
(pja0j)
∑
i∈c˜0
p0d0i ≤
1
p0
max
j
(pja0j)N0. (36)
A. Numerical simulation
In our major formula, Eq.(21), there are terms of maxi, this economic worst-case esti-
mation can be significantly smaller than the normal worst-case of maxi(piaki)
mini(p′ia
′
ki
)
estimation as
proposed in Ref.[19], hence Eq.(21) can improve the key rate a lot. Consider the model
that both decoy pulse and signal pulse are generated through attenuating a common father
pulse at time i. We set pvi = p0, pi = p and p
′
i = p
′ to be constants. The fluctuation of
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the final pulse out of Alice’s lab consists of two parts: father pulse fluctuation and device
(attenuator) parameter fluctuation. Suppose Alice wants to use intensity µ, µ′ for her decoy
pulse and signal pulse. She wants to obtain them through attenuating the father pulse of
intensity F by setting her attenuator’s transmittance to be λD =
µ
F
, λS =
µ′
F
for a decoy
pulse or for a signal pulse. However, the actual case is that at any time i, the intensity of
the father pulse is Fi = F (1 + δi), λDi = λD(1 + ǫid) and λSi = λS(1 + ǫis). We have the
upper bounds of: |δi| ≤ δ, |ǫid| ≤ ǫd and |ǫis| ≤ ǫs. The actual intensity of the ith pulse out
of Alice’s lab is
decoy : µi = µ(1 + δi)(1 + ǫid) (37)
signal : µ′i = µ
′(1 + δi)(1 + ǫis) (38)
max
i
(
paki
p′a′ki
) =
p
p′
(
µ(1 + ǫd)
µ′(1− ǫs)
)k exp{(1 + δ)[µ′(1− ǫs)− µ(1 + ǫd)]} (39)
for k ≥ 1 (40)
In a real experiment, only one pulse is prepared and sent out at any ith time. Values µi and
µ′i can be interpreted as the would-be values if Alice decided to produce a decoy pulse or
signal pulse at the ith time, given a certain set-up. The bound of vacuum count in Eq.(36)
is now n0d ≤
pN0
p0
e−mini(µi) and n0s ≥
p′N0
p0
e−maxi(µ
′
i). Note that here we have taken the normal
worst-case estimation only for the device fluctuation, while we have taken the economic
worst-case estimation for the intensity fluctuation of the father pulse. Our result here also
applies to a source state a little bit different from a coherent state: we just add very small
new fluctuation terms to the parameters aki, a
′
ki in the states. If these terms are negligibly
small, there effects to the final key rate is also negligible. Though there are also other
methods[18, 20, 22] for decoy-state QKD with fluctuating source, they[18, 20, 22] only apply
to the father pulse fluctuation, but not apply to the device fluctuation, as clearly pointed
out in[20, 21]. As shown already, our method does not assume zero device fluctuation since
it directly applies to the fluctuation of the final pulse out of Alice’s lab.
We use the experimental data for 50km given by done by Peng et al [16] QKD for
numerical simulation. The results are shown in Fig.1, where we set ǫd = ǫs = ǫ. We find
that the fluctuation of the father pulse intensity changes the final key rate very slightly using
Eq.(21) in this work in the calculation, while the device fluctuation still degrades the final
key rate drastically. Our results here also apply to the Plug-and-Play protocol[25].
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FIG. 1: Comparison of relative key rates to that of zero fluctuation. a: Relative key rates with
father-pulse-intensity fluctuation at ǫ = 0 and 2%. Line 1 and 2 are calculated with Eq.(21) of this
work and Eq.(58) of Ref.[19], respectively. b: Relative key rate with device fluctuation. b(left):
Result calculated with Eq.(58) of Ref.[19]; b(right) Result calculated with Eq.[21]. Line 1 and 2 in
b are for δ = 1%, 6%, respectively.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARK AND DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have presented a criteria for the secure decoy-state protocol with source
fluctuation. The AYKI protocol satisfies the criteria. A well known advantage of AYKI
protocol is that there is no need to make intensity switching. Given our proof here, AYKI
protocol neither needs intensity switching nor needs source intensity monitoring. As the
base of the conclusion, our general formulas here are efficient for other protocols, such as
the 3-intensity protocol using coherent states. It should be interesting to include the finite
size effects[3, 13, 26] in the future study.
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